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I. INTRODUCTION 
One feature of the current debate concerning the term “public authority” in the 
Human Rights Act 1998 is a rule to the effect that public authorities are not 
themselves capable of having and enforcing Convention rights1. In what follows 
this will be referred to as the “rights-restriction rule”. The position was confirmed 
by the House of Lords in Aston Cantlow2 and has been given effect by the courts in 
relation to English local authorities3 and to NHS Trusts in Scotland4. Despite this, 
doubts have been expressed. In particular the parliamentary Joint Committee has 
                                              
* Law School, Bournemouth University. Thanks to anonymous reviewers, Richard Edwards and 
Professor Barry Hough; all errors and infelicities are the author’s. 
1 E.g., S. Grosz, J. Beatson and P. Duffy Human Rights The 1998 Act and the European Convention 
(London 2000) chapter 4, 4.42-4.44; D. Oliver “The Frontiers of the State: Public Authorities 
and Public Functions under the Human Rights Act” [2000] P.L. 476. For a pre-Act discussion 
see D. Oliver “The  Underlying Values of Private and Public Law” in M. Taggart (ed) The Province 
of Administrative Law (Oxford 1997) ch .11. 
2 Parochial Church Council of the Parish of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley, Warwickshire v. 
Wallbank and another [2003] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 A.C. 546, at [8] (hereinafter Aston Cantlow v. 
Wallbank). 
3 R (Mayor of the City of Westminster) v. Mayor of London [2002] EWHC (Admin) 2440, [2003] 
B.L.G.R. 611, at [93]-[96]; R (Medway Council and others) v. Secretary of State for Transport [2002] 
EWHC (Admin) 2516, [2003] J.P.L. 583, at [20]. 
4 Grampian University Hospitals NHS Trust v. Procurator Fiscal [2004] H.R.L.R. 18 Appeal Court, 
High Court of Justiciary. 
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suggested, though without argument, that the denial of Convention rights to 
public authorities may be wrong in principle and that there are “circumstances in 
which public authorities have Convention rights”5.  
 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE “RIGHTS-RESTRICTION RULE” 
In discussion of the Joint Committee’s suggestion, two preliminary points must be 
made. First, the question whether public authorities have Convention rights needs 
to be distinguished from the question of their vires; second, the issue of a public 
authority having Convention rights will only arise, under the 1998 Act, if they 
satisfy other tests, in particular, the “victim” test6. These points mean that for 
many commentators the rights-restriction rule is a matter that may be of little 
consequence7. It is, for instance, unlikely to inhibit a regulatory public authority 
seeking to challenge ministerial decisions which affect the Convention rights 
enjoyed by a section of the public for which, given its powers, the authority is 
responsible. Unlike the “client group”, the authority is unlikely to have been 
directly affected in the ambit of what would be its own Convention rights, and so 
                                              
5 House of Lords House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights The Meaning of Public 
Authority under the Human Rights Act Seventh Report of Session 2003-4 HL Paper 39, HC 382, 
para. [23].  
6 Human Rights Act 1998 ss7(1) and 7(7); Article 34 ECHR. Eckle v. Germany (1982) 5 E.H.R.R. 
1, [66] (“…the person directly affected by the act or omission which is in issue…”). On 
comparisons with “ordinary” judicial review see: Miles, J. “Human Rights Standing under the 
Human Rights Act 1988: theories of rights enforcement and the nature of public law 
adjudication.” (2000) 59 C.L.J. (1) 133. 
7 Grosz, S., Beatson, J. and Duffy, P. op cit, see note 1 above, paras. [4.42]-[4.44]. 
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is not a “victim” for that reason, rather than because of the rights-restriction rule. 
Other remedies, in particular “ordinary” judicial review, remain available to an 
authority with sufficient interest and powers to make a legal challenge; public law 
rights, in that context, can include the need for intensive scrutiny by the courts of 
any ministerial decision affecting human rights8. Similarly, subject to questions of 
vires and locus standi,  public authorities can seek declarations about the general 
meaning of the law, such as its compatibility with European Community law, and 
in so doing are in a similar position to a non-governmental organisation (NGO)9. 
Again, like an NGO, a public authority, in any legal proceedings, whether or not 
founded on section 7 of the Human Rights Act, can, under section 3, argue for a 
particular interpretation of legislation to ensure possible compatibility with 
Convention rights. Like NGOs, public authorities may also be granted 
intervention rights in cases in their sphere of interest10. Such interventions are also 
permitted under the Strasbourg rules. In highly restricted circumstances it is even 
possible that a public authority might be recognised under Article 34 as a victim’s 
representative, and thereby be heard on the victim’s behalf, by the Court of 
Human Rights. The right to represent applicants is complex but one crucial test is 
                                              
8 E.g., R v. Ministry of Defence ex parte Smith [1996] Q.B. 517, 536 CA. 
9 R v. Secretary of State for Employment ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission [1995] 1 A.C. 1; cf R 
(Howard League) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWHC (Admin) 2497, [2003] 1 
F.L.R. 484: declarations on the application of the Children Act to Youth Offender Institutions. 
10 E.g., R v. Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission [2002] UKHL 25, 2002] H.R.L.R. 35. See 
Hannett, S. “Third Party Intervention: In the Public Interest?” [2003] P.L. 128-150. 
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that the victims must be individually identified and give their consent11; this is a 
possibility for a public body regulating identifiable individuals (such as Ofcom and 
broadcasting companies) rather than a general class of otherwise non-assignable 
persons12.  
There is some evidence that the rights-restriction rule may limit the effect 
of these existing procedural opportunities. The Administrative Court may reject a 
human rights ground urged by a public authority in “ordinary” judicial review if in 
effect it means recognising Convention rights vested in the authority13 including 
where a local authority is promoting the Convention rights of a part of its 
population who may be ill-equipped to do so for themselves14. It has also been 
suggested that non-victims may be barred from seeking declarations of 
incompatibility under section 415. If that is true, a public authority would be thus 
                                              
11 E.g., Zentralrat D.S.R.R. v. Germany (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. CD 209; A and others v. Denmark (1996) 
22 E.H.R.R. 458. 
12 See further: J. Miles, “Standing in a Multi-layered Constitution” in N. Bamforth and P. Leyland 
(eds.), Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (2003), ch 15. 
13 E.g., R (Medway Council and others) v. Secretary of State for Transport [2002] EWHC (Admin) 2516, , 
[2003] J.P.L. 583, at [20]. The authority conceded it had no Convention rights of its own but its 
claim to argue in terms of the Convention rights of its population was rejected. There is little 
discussion and it is unclear whether the authority’s point was rejected because of the rights-
restriction rule or because the authority was not “directly affected”. 
14 R (Mayor of the City of Westminster) v. Mayor of London [2002] EWHC (Admin) 2440, [2003] 
B.L.G.R. 611, at [93]-[96]. 
15 M. Supperstone and J. Coppell, “Judicial Review after the Human Rights Act” [1999] 3 
E.H.R.L.R. 301-329, 309 a view supported in Re S (Minors) (Care Order: Implementation of Care Plan) 
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restricted even if it met all the other criteria of being a “victim”, and in such a 
situation it would be treated differently from an NGO. 
The main impact of the rights-restriction rule is where there is a dispute 
between public authorities, including between an authority and ministers, over a 
matter which directly affects a public authority’s freedom of action in a context of 
Convention rights and freedoms. Such disputes may occur in situations where 
companies, NGOs and others could reasonably claim their Convention rights and 
freedoms are directly affected. For example, a right to freedom of expression 
might be claimed by a public authority wishing to publish a report or information 
which a minister or some other public body wishes to suppress16. Similarly, a 
public authority might wish to argue that some right, defined in terms of the 
Convention conception of private life, has been violated perhaps by a police 
search of its premises17 or by poor environmental conditions sufficient to raise a 
                                                                                                                                 
[2002] UKHL 10; [2002] 2 A.C. 291, at [88]. Cf R (Rusbridger) v. Attorney General [2003] UKHL 38, 
[2004] 1 A.C. 357, at [21]. Cited in J. Miles op cit see note 12 above. Standing for such a 
declaration, it is submitted, is likely to be refused at least where it would be tantamount to 
recognising Convention rights vested in a public authority. 
16 E.g. in Local Authority v. Health Authority (disclosure: restriction on publication) [2003] EWHC 
(Fam)2746; [2004] Fam. 96 (a dispute over rights of publication. Convention rights were relevant 
because the court was a public authority; but in effect the authority was asserting a right to 
freedom of expression); cf, London Regional Transport v. Mayor of London [2001] EWCA Civ 1491, 
[2003] B.L.G.R. 611.  
17 As in the Zircon affair (S. Bailey, D. Harris and B. Jones, Civil Liberties Cases and Materials 4th ed. 
(London 1995), pp. 454-455). That a search of offices can raise an issue under Article 8 has been 
accepted in, for example,  Noviflora AB v. Sweden (1993) 15 E.H.R.R. CD 6. 
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Convention issue18. Other potential effects of the rights-restriction rule do not 
involve inter-public authority conflict. For example, public authorities and 
individual officials are increasingly vulnerable to criminal charges in respect of 
actions taken in their official capacity. At trial they will enjoy Article 6 rights but 
might also have grounds to argue that the prosecution involves a retrospective 
application of criminal liability violating Article 719. Such a claim could be met 
through the impact of the court’s duty to act compatibly with Convention rights. 
But such discretion may be limited by the need not to subvert the rights-
restriction rule. If courts issue remedies which, in effect, recognise Convention 
rights of public authorities, why not recognise these rights directly through a 
weakening of the rule?20 
The rights-restriction rule is also behind a central argument about the 
Human Rights Act 1998: whether bodies, including commercial and charitable 
organisations, which are providing services to the public at the behest of central or 
local government, act illegally if they act incompatibly with Convention rights21. 
                                              
18 As in R. (Medway Council and others) v. Secretary of State for Transport [2002] EWHC (Admin) 2516, 
[2003] J.P.L. 583. 
19 A possibility, for example, given developments in corporate manslaughter; see G. Forlin, 
“Directing Minds: caught in a trap” (2004) 154, 7118  N.L.J. 326 
20 The Article 6 right of a standard public authority not to be compelled to accept Alternative 
Dispute Resolution was implicitly recognised in Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] 
EWCA Civ 576, [2004] 4 All ER 920. 
21 D. Oliver, “Functions of a Public Nature under the Human Rights Act” [2004] P.L. Summer 
329; cf  P. Craig, “Contracting out, the Human Rights Act and the Scope of Judicial Review” 
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The principal argument against them being so bound is driven, partially, by the 
concern that, given the rights-restriction rule, such bodies (for example, care 
homes, universities, perhaps the BBC) would not themselves be able to benefit 
from the protection of Convention rights. But the consequence of the argument is 
a denial of convention rights to individuals, including the vulnerable, who have 
been directly affected by the actions of such bodies, and who may have inadequate 
alternative remedies. Weakening the rights-restriction rule would, therefore, 
support the position that defends a broader rather than a narrower conception of 
the range of institutions to which the Human Rights Act applies22. 
 
III. “MIRRORING” THE CONVENTION: “STANDARD” AND 
“FUNCTIONAL” AUTHORITIES 
The principal reason, adopted in Aston Cantlow, for excluding public authorities 
from having Convention rights relates to the way the Act “mirrors”23 the 
Convention. The Convention rights whose protection is furthered by the Act, are, 
under the Convention, directed at the state which has the obligation to secure 
these rights for everyone. Given this, it is assumed that state agencies cannot 
themselves enjoy Convention rights. This assumption derives from the un-
                                                                                                                                 
(2002) 118 L.Q.R. 551-568 and House of Lords House of Commons Joint Committee on 
Human Rights op. cit. see note 5 above. 
22 The House of Lords House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights op. cit. see note 5 
above, urges a version of the broader view. This may explain the comment in text to note 5 
above. 
23 F. Bennion, “What sort of Human Rights Act?” (1998) 148 N.L.J. 6834, 488.  
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expressed obverse of the standing provision found in Article 34 which, along with 
“any person” or “group of individuals”, identifies “non-governmental 
organisation[s]” as capable of making applications before the Court of Human 
Rights24. The state is thereby defined in terms of governmental organisations.  
 Article 34 does not, expressly, require the exclusion of any or all 
governmental organisations from having Convention rights. Indeed, the term 
“non-governmental body” was added as a re-draft to the then Article 25 by the 
Committee of Experts whose aim was to identify, in an inclusive way, the scope of 
the right of individual petition25. Given this legislative history, Article 34 can be 
read as an inclusionary rule aiming to give non-state public interest groups, the 
nature of whose legal personality might not be clear, the right to apply to the court 
if they have been the victim of a rights violation. The scope of the exclusionary 
power of Article 34, on the other hand, is a matter for the Strasbourg institutions 
to decide on the basis of their theory of the proper reach of human rights law. As 
discussed below, the Court of Human Rights does indeed insist on a broad 
conception of “governmental” which takes the scope of the rights-restriction rule 
way beyond the central coercive authority in the state. The issue, however, is not 
argued in detail. 
                                              
24 Aston Cantlow v. Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 A.C. 546, at [8] per Lord Nicholls, [47] per 
Lord Hope, [87] per Lord Hobhouse and, by strong implication, [158]-[160] per Lord Rodger.  
25 See, for example, Collected Editions of the “Travaux Prèparatoires” of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff The Hague 1975) Volume I, p. 210 and, in particular: ibid (1976) 
Volume III, p 270. See further: Miles, J. op cit see note 6 above.  
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In United Kingdom law, the idea of a “governmental organisation” is 
“mirrored” and given effect through the definition of a “public authority” in 
section 6 of the Human Rights Act 199826. As is well known, section 6 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 distinguishes between what are here called “standard” 
public authorities, identified by section 6(1) alone, and what are here called 
“functional” authorities, identified in sections 6(3)(b) and 6(5) as “any person 
certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature”. The former are 
identified by institutional characteristics and the latter (which can be “any person” 
and thus incapable of identification by institutional characteristics) by tests for 
public function. The distinction between the two ways of being a public authority 
implies that an important, institutional, criterion for a “standard” public authority 
is being an organisation with no non-instrumental private side; an organisation 
with no commercial or charitable purposes characterising its ends. In Aston 
Cantlow the House of Lords “instinctively” recognised that “standard” public 
authorities included central government departments, local councils, the police 
and the armed forces. Other criteria were listed for identifying the full range of 
standard public authorities. Some of these, specifically public funding and the 
possession of special statutory powers, also appear in criteria suggested by their 
Lordships for “functions of a public nature” and, perhaps, should be discounted 
                                              
26 Confirmed in Aston Cantlow v. Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 A.C. 546: a (standard) 
public authority is a body “whose nature is governmental in a broad sense of that expression” at 
[7] per Lord Nicholls; a body “exercising governmental power” with “a range of functions which 
are, in a broad sense, governmental” at [160] per Lord Rodger. 
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for the institutional test for a standard public authority27. Criteria exclusively 
predicated on being a standard public authority include:- a requirement of 
democratic accountability, a duty to act only in the public interest, and the 
possession of a statutory constitution28. Further unambiguously institutional 
criteria were identified in Scotland by the Appeal Court, High Court of Justiciary 
in Grampian University Hospitals NHS Trust: a body established by the executive, 
with functions specified by the executive, with a legal duty to comply with 
directions from the executive and which is both funded by and dissolvable by the 
executive; in summary, bodies which are “wholly under the supervision of the 
state” and “very far from being an entity distinct from or independent of the 
State”, will meet the institutional criteria of being “standard” authorities29.  
Standard public authorities, identified in this institutional way, are bound in 
all they do by Convention rights and, according to the rights-restriction rule, are 
institutionally incapable in all that they do, of having their own Convention rights. 
“Functional” authorities are bound by Convention rights when exercising 
“functions of a public nature”, but they are not so bound in respect of their 
private acts30. Functional authorities are recognised in Aston Cantlow as being 
                                              
27 Aston Cantlow v. Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 A.C. 546, compare [7] with [12], per Lord 
Nicholls. Failing to distinguish institutional from functional tests in some recent Court of Appeal 
cases has been criticised, see D. Oliver, op cit see note 21 above and House of Lords House of 
Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights op. cit. see note 5 above. 
28 Aston Cantlow v. Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37; [2004] 1 A.C. 546, at [7] per Lord Nicholls 
referring to D. Oliver (2000) op. cit. see note 1 above.  
29 Grampian University Hospitals NHS Trust v. Procurator Fiscal [2004] H.R.L.R. 18, at [9] and [19]. 
30 Human Rights Act 1998, ss. 6(3)(b) and 6(5). 
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capable of exercising Convention rights, certainly in respect of their private acts. 
What is not clear is whether a functional authority can stand on its Convention 
rights in respect of an act which is directly attributable to its performance of a 
public function. Determining the Convention rights of “functional” authorities on 
the basis of whether or not they were acting in furtherance of a public function 
would be, it is suggested, incompatible with the Convention “mirroring” that is 
central to the way this aspect of the Human Rights Act 1998 is dealt with by the 
courts. There is no Strasbourg equivalent to “functional” authorities. Actions by 
non-state bodies can engage state responsibility under the Convention, but there is 
no implication that such responsibility is only engaged when the bodies are 
performing public functions or that such bodies are limited in the Convention 
rights they can enjoy, even over the same matter that engaged state 
responsibility31.  Article 34 seems to be entirely an institutional test which 
identifies bodies with standing by their institutional type (whether they are 
‘governmental’ in character) rather than by function. Under the Strasbourg case 
law a governmental body does not have Convention rights even when it is acting 
non-governmentally32. But the converse is not true - there is no indication in the 
Strasbourg cases that a non-governmental body exercising public functions, a 
charity or commercial company, for example, ceases to have Convention rights 
under Article 34 because the violation it alleges affects it in the way it is exercising 
                                              
31 E.g. punishment in independent schools engages state responsibility (Costello-Roberts v. United 
Kingdom (1995) 19 EHRR 112), and can found rights claims, at least by their head teachers (R 
(Williamson) v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] UKHL 15, [78]; but cf [35]. 
32 Ayuntamiento de Mula v. Spain (Ap 55346/00) (1991) 68 D&R 209 
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those functions33. If this is true, there is a difference in the legal standing of 
standard and functional public authorities in the way they exercise public 
functions; functional authorities, but not standard authorities, can assert 
Convention rights not only to further their private (commercial or charitable) 
interests but also to support the way they exercise public functions. The question 
is whether this difference in treatment is justifiable or whether it is arbitrary. 
 
IV. JUSTIFICATION AND THE CONCEPTION OF THE STATE 
The justification for the distinctive treatment of standard public authorities is to 
give effect to the relationship of state and society that is said to be implicit in the 
Convention. The Convention aims to provide a remedy against the institutions 
constituting the “state” since the securing of Convention rights and freedoms is 
the responsibility of the state34. In Aston Cantlow, Lord Rodger, agreeing with the 
Court of Appeal, said: “arts 1 and 34 assume the existence of a state which stands 
distinct from persons, groups and non-governmental organisations” 35. Such state 
institutions cannot themselves, by virtue of Article 34, have Convention rights 
because they are defined as being governmental. An expressed aim of the Human 
                                              
33 Article 34 would not be a barrier if, for example, the NSPCC, exercising its functions under the 
Children Act 1998, was prevented by a public authority from publishing matter relating to that 
function.  
34 Professor Oliver has pointed out that it is inappropriate in the Convention context to express 
this in terms of establishing domestic remedies against those bodies ‘for whose acts the state is 
answerable before the European Court of Human Rights’, D. Oliver, op. cit see note 21 above, 
333-334. 
35 Aston Cantlow v. Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 A.C. 546, at [159]. 
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Rights Act is to recognise a modern conception of state power and governance36. 
The elision of state and government, however, arguably creates an over-
monolithic conception of “government” that is not fully congruent with the 
modern “hollowed out” or “multi-layered” reality37.  
The privatisation of government is, of course, fully recognised in 
subsections 6(3)(b) and 6(5) of the Act. Nor is this problem of how the Act 
characterises the modern state principally focused on the creation of executive 
agencies since, constitutionally, these act on behalf of ministers and are not 
independent of them (though disputes involving the degree, if any, of autonomy 
enjoyed by the agency from ministerial authority can arise38.) The main 
characteristic of the modern, multi-layered, state that is not clearly recognised in 
the scheme of the Act concerns the wide and variable roles of the “quangos” or 
“non-departmental public bodies”39 including the various inspectorates, 
commissioners, directors general and other regulators which are increasingly 
found in the public life of the United Kingdom. Non-departmental public bodies 
meet some but not all of the institutional criteria of standard public authorities. 
They are not functional authorities since their purposes are entirely public; they 
                                              
36 “…a realistic and modern definition of the state” HC Deb. vol. 314 col. 406 (17th June 1998) 
(Jack Straw M.P.). See also Aston Cantlow v. Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 A.C. 546 at [9] 
per Lord Nicholls and at [159] per Lord Rodger. 
37 For recent discussions see, e.g., N. Bamforth and P. Leyland, (eds) Public Law in a Multi-Layered 
Constitution (London 2003). 
38 E.g., the dismissal of the Chief Executive of the Prison Service in 1995. 
39 See, for example, P. Craig, Administrative Law 5th ed., (London 2003) Ch. 4; Craig uses both 
terms. 
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have no, non-instrumental, private interests. They are bound by the criteria of 
“selflessness” and other criteria identified by the House of Lords in Aston 
Cantlow40 (though the scope and effectiveness of their duty of democratic 
accountability is a principal area of public law concern41). Similarly, their functions 
are likely to be within the definition of “governmental” or “public” including, 
often, a definition focused on the possession of special, ultimately coercive, 
powers42. On the other hand non-departmental public bodies will not fit easily 
with the institutional definition of a standard public authority if they are 
institutionally designed to have a significant degree of autonomy or independence 
from ministers, or from other intuitively “standard” authorities such as the police 
or local authorities. The need for this independence is a principal reason for their 
establishment. Of course the autonomy and independence of such bodies is 
subject to qualification. They are subject to varying degrees of control, 
supervision, influence, etc., from ministers or they may have complex 
relationships with other “standard” authorities. This qualified autonomy means 
that there is a potential for conflict and legal disputes between the non-
departmental public body and some other institution of the state, including a 
minister. If, for example, such a public body came under ministerial pressure not 
to publish a report, it would not distort language or meaning to say that the public 
                                              
40 See above, note 28 and related text. In Aston Cantlow v. Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37, [2004] 1 
A.C. 546 Lord Rodger implies that the Equal Opportunities Commission is a standard public 
authority at [152] 
41 E.g., C. Harlow and R. Rawlings Law and Administration 2nd ed. (London 1997), ch. 10. 
42 See D. Oliver (2000), op. cit. see note1 above. 
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body has been directly affected, as regards its freedom of expression, by an action 
of the government or the state. 
Non-departmental public bodies perform functions that may be more or 
less indistinguishable from “functional” authorities exercising public functions (e.g. 
a regulating and supervising function) or even, in some instances, from NGOs, 
such as where a public body has a broad promotional duty43. In performance of 
these functions all three, standard and functional public authorities and NGOs, 
can be directly affected by, be the “victim” of, “governmental”, usually ministerial, 
actions. However, in that the rights-restriction rule “mirrors” Article 34, it seems 
that standard authorities may not, whilst functional authorities and NGOs may, 
rely on appropriate Convention rights in their dealings with government and 
ministers. Given the functional similarities and overlaps between the three types 
of organisation there is a prima facie argument, based on equality for like cases, 
for treating standard public authorities in the same way as functional authorities 
and NGOs as regards the enjoyment of Convention rights. The question is 
whether there is a compelling argument, going to the identifying institutional 
character of standard public authorities, which trumps this equality claim and 
provides sufficient justification for differences in treatment.  
The denial of Convention rights to standard but not to functional 
authorities is supported by the Strasbourg case law on Article 34; and this extends 
to a broadly-drawn conception of governmental bodies. Reports and judgments 
                                              
43 E.g., the Equal Opportunities Commission’s duty to promote equality of opportunity (Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 s. 53(1)) or Ofcom’s duty to “further the interests of citizens in relation 
to communications matters” (Communications Act 2003 s. 3(1)(a)) 
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denying standing under Article 34 to public authorities indicate that the 
Strasbourg concept of a ‘governmental’ organisation includes bodies principally 
exercising public functions even if they also have private powers, such as the 
exercise of interests in land44. A “governmental” organisation includes not only 
“the central organs of the state” but also “decentralised authorities that exercise 
public functions” with “autonomy vis-à-vis the central organs” 45. As suggested 
above, the Court of Human Rights is not compelled by Article 34 to this position 
but is, rather, adopting an implicit and unarticulated theory of the nature and role 
of the state. The cases involve local councils, which are in the House of Lords’ 
“intuitive” list making up the traditional conception of the state. The fuller 
discussion in the Holy Monasteries46 case, which decided that monasteries of the 
Greek Orthodox Church are “non-governmental”, was not dealing with a body 
exercising public functions and so does not address the issue of whether an over-
homogeneous conception of government, inappropriate to the complex 
organisation of a modern state, is being inadvertently promoted in these decisions.  
The local authority cases are not fully argued, the discussion of the point is brief 
and axiomatic. They no doubt reflect a civilian sensitivity to the categorial 
distinction between state and civil society, though that does not rest easily with the 
                                              
44 Ayuntamiento de Mula v. Spain (Ap 55346/00) (1991) 68 D&R 209 
45 Danderyds Kommun v. Sweden (Ap 52559/99) (2001) First Chamber; see also Rothenthurm Commune 
v. Switzerland Ap 13252/87 (1988) D&R 59, p. 251 
46 Holy Monasteries v. Greece (1994) 20 E.H.R.R. 1.  
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more pragmatic approach of the common law47 and, in any case, is itself being 
adapted to the structures of the complex modern state48. They are also broadly in 
line with the notion of an “emanation of the state” developed by the European 
Court of Justice for identifying institutions that can be held responsible for the 
non-implementation of a directive. But the test in, for example, Foster v. British 
Gas, identifies institutions for the purposes of fulfilling the obligations of the 
state49. With its indifference to legal form and its requirement of public service, 
the Foster test reaches both standard and (some) functional public authorities and 
so cannot explain why those two types of body should be treated differently 
regarding their enjoyment of Convention rights as, it seems, they are under Article 
34 ECHR and, therefore, the Human Rights Act. We need further reasons 
explaining why the concept of the state as ultimate guarantor of Convention rights 
insists that all publicly constituted bodies (bodies with no non-instrumental 
private side) must be treated the same, no matter how variegated their forms of 
autonomy and authority, in respect of denying them the benefit of Convention 
rights.  
 
                                              
47 J.W. Allison “Theoretical and Institutional Underpinnings of a Separate Administrative Law” 
in M. Taggart (ed) The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford 1997).  
48 See D. Oliver Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (London 1999), pp.17-19 and the 
citations therein. 
49 Foster v. British Gas [1990] ECR-I  3313: “a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made 
responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing public services under the 
control of the state and has for that purpose special powers beyond those which result from the 
normal rules applicable in relations between individuals”. 
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V.  JUSTIFICATION AND THE CHARACTER OF PUBLIC POWER 
Professor Oliver, in particular, has argued that, in this context, there is a distinct 
problematic of public power which, in summary, is bounded by the exercise of 
coercive, regulatory authority within society50. Given this, there is nothing 
arbitrary about measuring the exercise of public power against special standards, 
whose overarching principle is “selflessness”; similarly it is proper to subject the 
exercise of such powers to Convention standards51. For reasons discussed below, 
the duty of selflessness is assumed to be incompatible with the possession and 
assertion of Convention rights and is, therefore, central to the justification for the 
rights-restriction rule. However, the principle of selflessness may not have this 
justifying power. Selflessness follows from an institutional characteristic of public 
institutions: the absence of a non-instrumental private side. But it is not clear why 
selflessness should not be a required characteristic of the exercise of all coercive 
regulatory authority whatever the legal and institutional form of its exercise. If that 
is the case, selflessness will be unable to explain and justify the different treatment 
of standard and functional authorities on the issue of the possession of 
Convention rights.  
The case for the duty of selflessness of all public bodies with no non-
instrumental private side is made in R v Somerset County Council ex parte Fewings 52. 
                                              
50 See, in particular, D. Oliver op cit  see note 21 above. 
51 Professor Oliver’s general theory includes the imposition of standards of “considerate 
decision-making” on private, often monopolistic, companies and organisations exercising public 
power.  
52 [1995] 1 All ER 513. Discussed by Oliver (1997) op cit. see note 1. 
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Laws J (as he then was) argued that a public body has no private existence in the 
sense of an existence operating behind the statutes by which it was created and 
empowered. There are two separate points. First, that a public authority cannot 
act other than on the basis of a proper, purposive, understanding of its powers 
and, second, that in exercising its powers, it must always act on its best conception 
of the public interest, a public authority having “no axe to grind beyond its public 
responsibility”. The first principle has priority over the second. It would, of 
course, be undesirable if a standard public authority could assert a right, for 
example, to private life or to property, against the claims of a private citizen. But 
this is not the direction of human rights claims, which are against the state (public 
authorities).  Different issues arise if an authority’s claim to such rights was 
asserted as a matter to be weighed by a court in a judgment of proportionality 
against, for example, a minister’s attempt to restrict the authority’s freedom in 
order to advance a pressing social need. Nevertheless, if such a claim was merely 
the public authority “grinding its own axe”, then the matter would be ultra vires 
on the general principle of administrative law expressed in Fewings; this, rather 
than the rights-restriction rule, would be the explanation and justification of the 
outcome of the case.  
The justification of the rights-restriction rule is, therefore, based on an 
assumption that the duty to act selflessly and the possession of Convention rights 
are intrinsically incompatible. The argument that public authorities might have 
Convention rights, on the other hand, is a claim that there are situations in which 
a public authority might believe that the best way to advance, within its powers, its 
conception of the public interest, is by claiming the benefit of a human right for 
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itself precisely as body which only has the power to use the benefit of that right in 
the public interest. Against this stands the view that seems to equate the 
possession of a Convention right with the assertion of solely private interests. Yet 
nothing in the philosophy of human rights makes it impossible for them to be 
exercised in the public interest as if they were necessarily a human characteristic 
akin to the possession of property. In the kinds of cases in which claims of 
Convention rights for standard public authorities are likely to arise, the issue for 
the courts will be to choose between the legal rights of parties both of whom are 
acting on the basis of what their conception of the public interest requires. There 
is no reason in principle why a standard public authority’s claim to the benefit of a 
Convention right should be assumed to be capable only of advancing an interest 
of the authority’s that is independent of its public duty and hence should be 
discounted.   
Support for the rights-restriction rule can include a political preference for 
a distinction between state and civil society in which liberty is best promoted by a 
vigorous civil society where individuals and their associations enjoy freedom to 
formulate, promote and protect their own interests and conceptions of 
worthwhile ways of living. Governance, the state’s function, is properly limited to 
the exercise of coercive power or special authority over others. The desirability of 
pluralism means that wider functions, specifically the provision of welfare, 
educational and other services, albeit funded and ordered by the state, should be 
part of civil society rather than subjected to the authoritarian tendency of state 
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control53. This is an attractive argument for a liberal society. It need not, however, 
mean that the benefits of pluralism flow exclusively from bodies and institutions 
that are, at least in part, private. There is what may be an equally attractive 
argument that some functions affecting the public, including, for example, either a 
“watchdog” or a representative function, though non-coercive and non-
regulatory, are best performed by bodies which, defined by institutional 
characteristics, are entirely public. The public duties of such bodies, including their 
duty of “selflessness”, may make them more truly representative, less 
“ideological”, better resourced and better able to make a convincing case in 
conditions of polycentric complexity than can an NGO operating in the same 
sphere54. There is no reason to think, for example, that the Equal Opportunities 
Commission is not an effective representative of the general interests of women 
or that HM Chief Inspector of Prisons is not at least as effective in relation to 
prisoners’ issues as are the similarly interested NGOs. A weakening of the rights-
restriction rule would make such authorities better able to perform their functions 
in so far as they are brought into conflict with other authorities. 
 
III CONCLUSION 
The rights-restriction rule prevents standard public authorities from asserting 
Convention rights. It has been suggested above that the basis for this rule, the 
                                              
53 D. Oliver (2000) op. cit. see note 1 above at pp. 492-3 
54 S. Hannett, “Third Party Intervention: In the Public Interest?” [2003] P.L. 128-150; cf  M. 
Arshi, and C. O’Cinneide, “Third Party interventions: the public interest reaffirmed” [2004] P.L. 
69-77 
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mirroring of Article 34 inherent in the Human Rights Act, does not comfortably 
justify the application of the rule to the full range of bodies and institutions that 
are within the definition of standard public authorities. An inappropriately 
homogenous conception of governmental bodies emerges from the test for 
standard authority. The test relates to institutional character rather than function 
and includes not only ministers, Parliament and the courts, bodies exercising the 
ultimate coercive authority of the state, but extends to the highly variable range of 
inspectorates, commissioners, regulators and others who are exercising public 
powers, but whose institutional identity and legal powers are designed to give 
them independence from ministers but an independence qualified by various 
intervention rights that ministers can exercise. Given that Convention rights are, 
in character, rights against the state, there is a case for saying that some such 
standard public authorities could, reasonably, enjoy Convention rights at least in 
respect of their legal rights regarding disputes with other standard authorities 
including ministers. A significant objection to this is that, absent amendment to 
the Human Rights Act, all standard authorities would have to enjoy Convention 
rights, and such rights could not be confined to litigation between public 
authorities but could also be asserted by a public authority against non-state 
claimants including those making human rights claims against the authority. Two 
answers to this point are suggested. First, given that the rights-restriction rule is 
derived from the Human Rights Act’s “mirroring” of the Convention, including 
Article 34, it is noticeable that the exclusionary, as distinct from the inclusive, 
force of  Article 34 reflects an unargued and implicit conception of state and 
government. Because of the heterogeneous, multi-layered, nature of modern 
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government, this conception may be in need of refinement in order to deal with 
various kinds of intra-governmental disputes; disputes brought, in pursuance of 
their conception of the public interest, by standard public authorities against 
others including political and legal superiors. Second, the objection to standard 
public authorities enjoying the benefit of Convention rights presumes that the 
exercise of such rights is incompatible with their overriding duty of selflessness. 
Here it is suggested that there is no necessary incompatibility between exercising 
Convention rights and acting in the public interest. The duty of selflessness goes 
to the legal powers, the vires, of a public authority and so any claim to Convention 
rights that was, in effect, merely self-serving, would be discounted as ultra vires. If 
standard public authorities have Convention rights, the core case would be of a 
public authority, directly affected by a decision or action of another authority, 
such as a minister, which decision the authority wishes to resist on the basis of its 
conception of the public interest. The particular advantage is that standard public 
authorities are then equally placed with functional authorities and others when 
performing important public interest functions, including “watchdog” and 
representative roles, which may bring them into dispute with other agencies of the 
state. 
